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An Analysis of the Formation of Property
Rights Underlying Tortious Interference
with Contracts and Other Economic
Relations
Interference with contract, interference with prospective ad-
vantage, and other economic torts have a long history. Under Ro-
man law, the head of a household could bring an action for injuries
to members of his household;1 a similar action reported by
Bracton 2 was limited during the fifteenth century to an action by a
master for loss of his servant's services.3 In response to the loss of
workers caused by the plague, an action was created by the Statute
of Labourers,4 which provided that the enticing away of another
man's servants would be grounds for imprisonment.
The modern history of interference torts begins with the cele-
brated case of Lumley v. Gye. 5 The Queen's Bench found that
where the defendant maliciously procures a party to breach a valid
contract to give her services to the plaintiff, the plaintiff obligee
may recover in tort.' Temperton v. Russell 7 extended that liability
to encompass interference with contracts not involving personal
services, as well as to interference with mere economic
expectancies.8
Although courts disagree in some important respects as to the
exact boundaries of liability for tortious interference, 9 there is now
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 663 (1923).
2 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND fol. 116, at 326 (S. Thorne ed.
1968).
'Sayre, supra note 1, at 665 (citing Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, pl. 21 (1410)).
' 23 Edw. 3, ch.2 (1349).
5 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
8 Id. at 224-25, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53.
[1893] 1 Q.B. 715.
See infra text following note 120.
There are two principal areas of uncertainty. First, although some mental state is
required for all forms of interference liability, courts have not yet settled on a firm standard.
Most jurisdictions find mere negligence insufficient. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 129, at 938 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expec-
tancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664, 664 & n.3 (1964). But see J'aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (court allowed recovery for
the interference caused to plaintiff's restaurant trade by defendant's negligent performance
of a construction contract with the plaintiff's lessor). Even knowledge of the existence of a
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widespread acceptance of the general rules of interference liability.
Where the interest disturbed is a contract, even one that is voida-
ble or terminable at will, intentional interference is prima facie ac-
tionable;10 where the interest is only an expectancy, intentional in-
terference is again actionable, yet any legitimate commercial
motive of the interferor can serve as an affirmative defense.11
These bare bones of the structure of liability-causation, a mental
state more culpable than simple negligence,' and privilege for
commercially motivated interference-have been secure for nearly
one hundred years in England' and for almost as long in the
United States.14
In contrast to general judicial acceptance of the tort, American
contract will not always be sufficient to allow recovery where the defendant's primary objec-
tive in interfering with the contract was not to interfere. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 766 comment j (1979); W. PROSSER, supra, § 129, at 941-42. In general, the tort is
predicated on the defendant's malice, defined as intent to interfere without justification. W.
PROSSER, supra, § 129, at 942; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
Second, courts have not yet agreed on the proper scope of the defense of privilege or
justification. Interference because of a disinterested desire to protect the obligor, see Said v.
Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497, in the name of public morals, see Brimelow v. Casson, [1924] 1 Ch.
302 (preventing prostitution); Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906) (preventing spread
of typhus), or by giving advice to breach, see W. PROSSER, supra, § 129, at 944 n.6, is gener-
ally not actionable, depending on the interferor's motive. Interference for the purpose of
furthering the interferor's economic advantage, on the other hand, involves the court in
balancing the interferor's and society's interest in free competition against the interest of
the party interfered with and of society in the sanctity of contract and other economic rela-
tions. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 762 comment g (1979).
10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
22 See id. §§ 767 comment f, 768 (competition gives privilege to interfere with expectan-
cies, not with contracts), 769; W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 130, at 954-62.
12 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979).
13 The English law has been largely settled since Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B.
715, was decided in 1893. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979). Some disa-
greement has persisted. For example, in Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. 1 (H.L. 1897), the defen-
dant iron-workers' union coerced the plaintiff into ceasing to deal with a rival union under
threat of a strike by the defendants. Although several judges, most notably Lord Herschell,
criticized the reasoning in Temperton to the extent that it supported the proposition that
malice alone was actionable, none suggested that Temperton was wrongly decided. (For a
full discussion of the case, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.) Four years later,
in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 A.C. 495 (H.L.), the House of Lords reaffirmed the liability of an
intentional interferor with an expectancy. The court upheld liability where the primary in-
tent was to injure. Id. at 512 (opinion of Lord Shand). Although some of the opinions at-
tempt to distinguish Allen on the basis of an absence of conspiracy, most, particularly that
of Lord Shand, advance an analysis similar to this comment's, namely, that interference
with an expectancy in which the interferor is not directly interested is actionable. Id.; see
infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Whereas the defendants in Allen were interested
in doing the ironwork performed by their rivals, the defendants in Quinn were not seeking
the business of the plaintiff whose expectancy they disrupted, but merely the advancement
of their union.
4 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 129, at 930.
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commentators have long regarded it as lacking independent theo-
retical justification.15 They argue that interference with contracts
and economic expectancies should not give rise to liability where
the means of interference are not tortious in their own right, possi-
bly excepting interference done purely for spite.16 This comment
will present a theoretical justification for interference liability. It
will first examine recent scholarship concerning economic torts, fo-
cusing on current analyses of the property rights underlying the
torts. It will then analyze those property rights in light of the cases
involving animals ferae naturae, which are the principal source of
the common law of the acquisition of property. Finally, it will ap-
ply the fruits of the analysis of the wild animal cases to a number
of well-known interference cases and argue that an obligee or a
party expecting to enter into contract has a property right in the
pursuit of expected performance free from interference by third
parties.
I. RECENT SCHOLARSHIP
Recent scholarly commentary on interference torts, like recent
torts scholarship in general, falls into two camps: economic-utilita-
rian and corrective justice. The former analyzes liability rules in
terms of maximizing the wealth of society as a whole;1 7 the latter
predicates liability on the infringement of some protected property
interest of the individual plaintiff."" This comment accepts as its
starting point the corrective justice account of tort law and will
concern itself principally with the criticism that a plaintiff whose
contract or expectancy has been interfered with has suffered no
harm to any property interest good against the world.
'5 See, e.g., Wigmore, The Boycott and Kindred Practices As Ground For Damages, 21
AM. L. RE v. 509, 521-22 (1887) (no liability for interference by lawful means); cf. Sayre,
supra note 1, at 702-03 (no liability for interference with contracts except where interferor
procures breach deliberately;, no liability for interference with expectancies).
26 See, e.g., Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A
Clash of Tort and Contract Theory, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 61, 94-97 (1982).
See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE. (1981).
,5 See, e.g., Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 441-42 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Intentional Harms]. But see Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Nuisance Law],
and Epstein, The Principles of Environmental Protection: The Case of Superfund, 2 CATO
J. 9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Superfund], where Epstein argues that the remedies availa-
ble under a strict liability regime must be modified, as they must in any legal theory, to take




A. Economic Criticism of Interference Torts
A complete critique of the normative criticism of interference
torts made by economic analysts must await another day. Eco-
nomic criticism of interference torts, however, suffers shortcomings
as a positive matter, as can be seen in the arguments of Professors
Rizzo and Perlman. -
Professor Rizzo's analysis limits interference liability to those
situations where it is socially beneficial. In a recent article,19 he
argues that the negligent interruption of input or output of some
commodity often causes social loss rather than a mere transfer of
gain from one producer to another.20 Rizzo then notes that a party
physically injured by an interferor's negligence who is unable to
perform contractual obligations may sue the interferor for indem-
nity for the contract damage owed to the injured party's obligee;
society thus concentrates causes of action in those who have suf-
fered physical injury.2 ' Recovery for economic harms is allowed
where socially beneficial, i.e., where the costs of channeling losses
through the party suffering physical harm plus the expected costs
of litigation are outweighed by the value of allowing recovery. 22
The chief problem with Rizzo's analysis as a positive matter is
the starting point for Professor Perlman: the breach of a contract,
unlike the commission of a tort, is usually the signal of social gain,
as resources are reallocated away from the breached contract to a
more socially valuable end.23 This occurs, for example, whenever
the obligor of a contract is made an offer that benefits him more
than the sum of the benefits to him and the obligee of the prior
contract, for then the obligor can idemnify the prior obligee for the
benefit of his bargain and still benefit from breaking the contract.2
As a positive matter, therefore, Rizzo's theory does not account for
the broad class of cases where interference liability discourages
wealth-increasing transactions.
Perlman's analysis is also inadequate as a positive theory,
however. After noting that interference liability frequently discour-
ages efficient breaches of contracts,25 Perlman argues that liability
" Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 286-
91 (1982).
20 Id. at 286-91.
21 Id. at 283-84.
22 Id.
23 Perlman, supra note 16, at 82-83.
24 See R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSiS OF LAW § 4.9 (2d ed. 1977).
26 Pernman, supra note 16, at 82.
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should be restricted to instances either of interference by indepen-
dently tortious means or of malicious interference, where malice
can be demonstrated objectively by behavior likely to lead to a de-
crease in social wealth.26 Although it is true, as Perlman suggests,
that the boundaries of interference liability are as yet unsettled,7
the paradigmatic case of intentional interference with a contract
by lawful means has been actionable since Lumley v. Gye,28 even
where the induced breach increases social wealth. The stability and
uniformity of this core area of interference liability casts doubt on
attempts such as Perlman's and Rizzo's to portray the essential
concern of the tort as economic efficiency.
B. Corrective Justice Criticism of Interference Torts
Interference torts have also been questioned by corrective jus-
tice theorists. A common objection is that torts compensate for in-
terference with property rights, something absent in interference
torts. The most straightforward of recent criticisms in this vein is
that of Professor Dobbs.2 9 Dobbs notes that malice alone cannot
make an otherwise lawful act tortious.30 Following Prosser31 and
Sayre,3 2 Dobbs concludes that "[i]f we protect [a] contract against
all interference, we give it the quality of property-it becomes
good against the world.""3 He attacks that attribution of the quali-
ty of property on the ground that it allows two parties between
themselves to bind the conduct of strangers to their contract, ig-
noring the usual limitation of privity."4
Professor Perlman also criticizes the characterization of con-
tract rights as property by analyzing the remedies allowed under
actions for breach of contract and for interference with contract."
26 Id. at 94-97.
27 Id. at 64-67 (noting uncertainty as to the definition of the requisite mental state,
types of contracts to be protected, and the means of interference that are actionable).
28 2 El. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
20 See generally Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK.
L. REv. 335 (1980).
30 Id. at 347-48 (adjudication must turn on one's acts, not one's state of mind).
31 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 129, at 930-31.
32 Sayre, supra note 1, at 675.
3 Dobbs, supra note 29, at 351.
34 Id. at 350-56. Dobbs notes a number of exceptions to his objection to the imposition
of constraints on third parties, including the creation of patents, which, he suggests, are the
price society pays to encourage creativity. Id. In contrast, the formation of a contract, al-
though it may result in an increase in the wealth of the parties, does not create new prop-
erty. Id. at 352-53.
2" Perlnan, supra note 16, at 91-93.
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Normally, the common law of contract does not compel perform-
ance, but gives an obligor the choice of performing or paying the
obligee the value of his performance;36 barring the exceptional
remedy of specific performance, the obligor's performance is not
the obligee's property until the obligor has performed. The liability
of an interferor to the obligee, on the other hand, includes the
value of the contract and all foreseeable resultant harms3 7 and ren-
ders any contract between the obligor and the interferor that de-
pends on the breach of the prior contract void for illegality.88 If an
obligee is indifferent as to receiving performance or the value of
performance, he is not harmed by interference with his contract,
since he retains his right to the value of performance against the
obligee; if contract damages are in fact undercompensatory, Perl-
man argues, "it seems a far better reform to adjust the damage
rule in all breach cases rather than to attempt to reach full com-
pensation only where there is a third-party inducer.""9
Professor Epstein's theory of corrective justice provides the
most fundamental challenge to the notion that one who interferes
with a contract infringes a property right in either of the con-
tracting parties to performance. Epstein's analysis of tort law be-
gins with an underlying theory that fixes the initial distribution of
property rights40 by the rule of first possession: whoever first ob-
tains physical control over a previously unowned thing acquires
ownership.41 Prior to first possession, no one, except perhaps the
sovereign, can claim ownership. 42 Having established first posses-
sion as the root of property rights, Epstein defines property rights,
following tradition, s as the right voluntarily to use, possess, and
dispose of the thing owned.44 A tort is any act that coerces a prop-
erty owner by force or fraud to relinquish a property right.45
36 Id. at 79-80 & n.92.
37 Interference with contract is a tort, hence an interferor is liable for all harms proxi-
mately caused by his tortious conduct. See id. at 88; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
774A (1979) (damages include consequential economic harms and emotional duress).
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 194 (1981).
" Perlman, supra note 16, at 93.
40 Epstein, Private Property and the Public Domain: The Case of Antitrust, in 24 NO-
MOS: THE LAW AND ECONoMics 48, 49 (1982).
41 See generally Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979).
4' See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
43 Epstein, supra note 40, at 77 n.20.
41 Id. at 57; Epstein, supra note 41, at 1221.
45 See Epstein, supra note 40, at 59 ("[iln essence, therefore, force (taking or breaking)
and misrepresentation are the only types of conduct that are constrained in B by a social
recognition of ownership in A").
Because Epstein embraces strict liability, he cannot rely on the inherent limitations on
1983]
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Under Epstein's corrective justice analysis, interference liabil-
ity suffers from two basic flaws. First, the obligee to a contract
probably, and the potential beneficiary of an expectancy certainly,
do not have ownership of the performance contracted for or ex-
pected, since neither has received that performance. Indeed, the
whole purpose of contracts is to make certain that an obligee in
fact receives the performance for which he bargained. Epstein
gives as an example the case of Union Oil Co. v. Oppen.4 The
plaintiffs in Oppen were fishermen whose livelihood was destroyed
when the defendant spilled oil into the Santa Barbara Channel.
The plaintiffs sued for the loss of the prospective value of the fish
they would have caught, and the Ninth Circuit held the complaint
stated a valid cause of action.47 Epstein finds this case an easy one:
The plaintiffs who do not own the fish cannot complain if the
Union Oil Company captures them. As they cannot complain
of capture, they cannot complain of destruction after capture.
As they cannot complain of destruction after capture, they
cannot complain of it before capture. No theory of tortious
liability can make up the plaintiffs' deficit attributable to
their want of ownership.48
Epstein's analysis is easily applied to interference torts. If the
plaintiff has no ownership of the subject matter of the contract or
expectancy, he has suffered no legally cognizable injury when that
liability imported into the prima facie case in a negligence system by foreseeability of harm.
Epstein's theory compensates for the loss of proximate cause by strengthening the require-
ment of cause in fact. Causation must be more restrictive than "but for" causation in a
theory of strict liability. Epstein narrows causation to four paradigms: A hit or forced B, A
frightened B, A compelled B to hit C, and A created a dangerous condition that was subse-
quently triggered, harming B. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
166-89 (1973). Essentially, force or fraud are the only means of causation that fit within
these paradigms.
46 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
47 Id. at 568-71.
4'8 Nuisance Law, supra note 18, at 52. The Oppen case illustrates the problem of an
injury to a resource to which everyone has access but that no one owns. Either everyone is a
proper plaintiff by virtue of his privilege of access, or no one is because no one owns the
resource. Epstein's response to the common pool problem is government ownership of the
common pool, at least in this case; exploitation would then be permitted only by license.
Superfund, supra note 18, at 35-36. Under the theory of this comment, liability would at-
tach if the injurer of a common pool had notice of a plaintiff's pursuit of the pooled re-
source, see infra text accompanying notes 90-112, hence the class of proper plaintiffs would
be sharply limited. Thus, liability in Oppen would attach if the defendant had notice of the
fishermen's activities. No question of privilege under the analysis set forth below arises,




contract or expectancy is interfered with.
Epstein's second objection derives from the implications of as-
signing property rights in expectancies. If such a property exists,
then the beneficiary of the expectancy has some right to compel
the future performance he seeks. This conclusion does not comport
with the performer's right, as absolute owner of his labor, to dis-
pose of it to whomever he wants.49 If the prospective performer is
free to dispose of his labor, and he contracts with another party
without coercion, then an action by the beneficiary of the prospec-
tive performance against that third party must fail on causal
grounds: the voluntary act of the prospective performer in entering
into a contract is a novus actus interveniens.1
Epstein allows recovery for the value of an expectancy only in
the case of interference with what he terms the "narrow" right to
trade, which is the right to offer one's property to the world for
exchange on whatever terms one wishes.51 The right to offer freely
is part of the right to dispose that is an incident of ownership of
one's property and person.52 When an interferor uses force or fraud
to deprive someone of the opportunity to offer his property or ser-
vices, the causal chain remains intact; the interferor has harmed
the offeror's rights in his own property, not his interest in the
property of a third party.
As a positive theory of economic torts, Epstein's analysis has
several shortcomings. First, although he never explicitly discusses
interference with formal contracts, his causal analysis there would
seem to prove too much. If every voluntary, uncoerced act by the
obligor to a contract were a novus actus, then the obligee would
never have a cause of action against an interferor, such as the de-
fendant in Lumley v. Gye, who merely makes the obligor a better
offer. Second, Epstein's analysis does not account for the presence
of malice as the central element in the courts' analysis of interfer-
ence liability. Under Epstein's theory of strict liability, the
tortfeasor's mental state forms no part of the prima facie case;
mental states are relevant only in overcoming a defendant's other-
wise valid affirmative defense.5 Third, Epstein leaves no room for
" Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 432.
50 Id. at 431-33.
51 Id. at 428. For an example of such a case, see Tarleton v. M'Gawley, Peake 270, 170
Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793) (defendant fired shots at natives who were approaching the plain-
tiff intending to trade and scared them away).
5' Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 425-26.
53 Id. at 428-29. The prima facie case consists of the defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's property right by one of the causal paradigms discussed supra note 45. Id.
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liability for malicious interference with expectancies by otherwise
lawful means, an area of liability recognized since Temperton.
Fourth, Epstein does not explain the similar treatment the law ac-
cords the analysis of interference with both contracts and expec-
tancies.4 Some other theory is needed to explain the law as it
stands.
C. Toward a Positive Theory of Interference Liability
This comment builds from Epstein's strict liability theory of
tort law. 5 It differs from Epstein's account of property rights in
that it recognizes rights in the free pursuit of economic advantages
before the advantages are obtained.56 The remainder of this com-
ment will concern itself with constructing and independently justi-
fying, by appeal to cases concerning the capture of wild animals,
the property rights whose infringement interference liability com-
pensates. Those rights, as other commentators have pointed out,
57
cannot be found in the performance expected or contracted for,
since the existence of such rights would imply that a party negoti-
See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 130, at 952.
See generally supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
" An examination of Tarleton v. M'Gawley, Peake 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793)
and variations of its facts will illustrate where Epstein's and this comment's accounts of
interference torts, and their underlying property rights, diverge. The plaintiff in Tarleton
was a shipowner whose ship was approaching the shore of Africa intending to trade with
natives gathered there. The defendant's ship fired its guns at the natives, scaring them
away. Epstein would hold the defendants liable, since they used force to interfere with the
plaintiff's right to offer his goods to the natives. See Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at
429. Under the theory of this comment, liability would attach because the defendant, with
notice, interfered with the plaintiff's expectancy in trade with the natives without having a
direct commercial interest in that trade; i.e., the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of
his interest by making the natives a better offer.
In the first variation of the facts of Tarleton, assume that the defendant instead scares
off the natives when he shoots at an albatross flying overhead, not knowing of the plaintiff's
presence. Epstein would hold the defendant liable, since he used force to coerce the natives
into not dealing with the plaintiff, thus interfering with the plaintiff's narrow right to trade.
The theory advanced in this comment would find no liability, since the existence of a right
to noninterference in the plaintiff against the defendant depends on the defendant's having
had prior notice of the plaintiff's pursuit. See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
In the second variation, assume the plaintiff and the natives had a prior contract. The
defendant, knowing of the contract, arrives first, makes a better offer, and obtains the na-
tives' wares. Epstein would find no liability, since the harm to the plaintiff's right to trade
does not fit one of his causal paradigms, see supra note 45, the harm is not caused by force
or fraud, and the agreement by the natives with the defendant interrupts the causal chain.
Under this comment's theory, the defendant would be liable, since the plaintiff would have
a property right against the defendant in the pursuit of the contract not subject to a privi-
lege for commercial interest. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
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ating a deal was in some sense already bound specifically to
perform.
Prior analysis has incorrectly emphasized the relationship be-
tween the obligee and obligor, or prospective obligee and obligor.
This comment will focus on the relationship between the obligee
and the interferor as competing pursuers of the same economic
good, the performance of the obligor. The relationship between
pursuers of an economic good, viewed in isolation from the party
whose goods or services they seek, is essentially indistinguishable
from the relationship between pursuers of the same wild animal.
By concentrating solely on the pursuers and their rights and privi-
leges against each other, one avoids the questions of causation and
indemnity that result from viewing those rights and privileges as
channelled through the obligor or potential obligor. Both an obli-
gee or potential obligee and a hunter seek an economic good that
they as yet do not possess. Thus an analysis of cases concerning
animals ferae naturae is doubly illuminating; not only are the wild
animal cases the principal source of common-law jurisprudence
concerning the acquisition of property rights, but they also provide
an analogy to the interference cases, which concern the pursuit of
some unpossessed good by competing individuals.58
Both the economic and corrective justice theorists discussed
above intend their theories to be normative analyses, not positive
accounts. Nonetheless, to the extent that a normative theory is not
descriptive of existing case law, it must do more than provide an
account of how those cases should have been decided; it must
demonstrate by its own internal logic, and by its descriptive and
explanatory power in other areas of the law, that it should be ap-
plied in areas where previously it has not been.
The raw "observations" of legal theories are cases, and unlike
the observations underlying physical theories, they are always ra-
tional, for judges must give reasons for how they decide cases.
Where the courts uniformly agree both as to certain paradigms of
liability and as to the underlying structure of analysis and policy
" Chief Judge Holt noted the similarity between the acquisition of property rights and
interference torts in Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707),
where he analogized the case at bar, in which the defendant frightened away the plaintiff's
ducks, to a hypothetical case, in which one schoolmaster frightened students away from
another. Keeble v. Hickeringill is reported several times and in different ways in the English
reports. It is reported as Keeble v. Hickeringill, Cas. t. Holt 14, 17, 19, 90 Eng. Rep. 906,
907, 908, as Keble v. Hickeringill, 11 Mod. 74, 88 Eng. Rep. 898; 11 Mod. 131, 88 Eng. Rep.
945, and as Keeble v. Hickeringhall, 3 Salk. 9, 91 Eng. Rep. 659 (K.B. 1707). The compari-
son to the schoolmaster example is not found in all reports.
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justifying the imposition of that liability, it does not suffice for a
normative theory simply to state that "there is no reason why the
legal results should not be altered to conform to the theory."5 Of
two rival normative theories, the one that preserves and justifies
the existing case law, in both its holdings and its reasoning, with
greater fidelity is to be preferred, all else being equal.
The theory advanced in this comment is part positive, part
normative. It is positive in that it relies solely on principles derived
from legal sources in characterizing the structure of liability it
presents. It is normative in that it argues that liability for interfer-
ence with economic relations should be imposed according to a
structure of rules derived by extending general legal principles to
economic harms, where they have been rarely applied.
This comment will argue that the right to free pursuit of unac-
quired property, including unacquired performance, is a right rec-
ognized not only by cases imposing liability for interference with
contracts and expectancies, but by the general common law con-
cerning the acquisition of property. Once that right has been
demonstrated, an analysis of its extent will account for several fea-
tures of interference liability, including damages exceeding the
value of the underlying performance, the role of the mental ele-
ment commonly deemed "malice" in the prima facie case, the func-
tion of privilege in liability for interference with expectancies, and
the similar treatment accorded interference with both contracts
and expectancies. The analysis will then be applied to well-known
interference cases, where it will provide a positive corrective justice
account for the core areas of liability.e
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PURSUIT
A. The Existence of Rights in the Pursuit of Wild Animals
An analysis of the common law of acquisition of property
should begin with the famous case of Pierson v. Post.6 1 Plaintiff
Post was chasing a fox in plain view of defendant Pierson on an
unpossessed stretch of beach. Pierson rushed in, killed the fox, and
carried it off.62 The question before the court was whether Post,
"by the pursuit with his hounds in the manner alleged in his decla-
ration, acquired such a right to, or property in, the fox as will sus-
59 Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 431.
60 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text for an account of those areas.
61 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
62 Id. at 175.
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tain an action against Pierson for killing and taking him away. '6 3
After surveying the history of, and commentary on, the taking of
wild animals since Justinian, the court held that no right in a pur-
sued animal accrues until its "pursuer manifests an unequivocal
intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use, has de-
prived him of his natural liberty, and brought him within his cer-
tain control," either by manucaption, securing the animal with
nets, or mortal wounding. 4 Since the fox was not within Post's cer-
tain control, the court held that Pierson had caused him no cogni-
zable injury.
Another case commonly cited for the proposition that a pur-
suer of a wild animal acquires no rights until capture is Young v.
Hichens.6 5 In that case, the plaintiff had drawn his nets around a
school of fish, leaving a gap of some seven fathoms, in which two of
the plaintiff's boats were stationed, splashing water so as to
frighten the fish away from the opening. The defendant rowed
through the opening and seized some of the fish, allowing the rest
to escape and tearing the plaintiff's nets in the process.6 The
plaintiff sued for damage to his nets and for conversion of the
fish.6 7 Argument before the Queen's Bench turned on whether the
plaintiff, by nearly closing his nets and stationing men in the gap,
had obtained sufficient physical control over the fish to vest title in
him. In what is regarded as the crux of the case,"' Lord Denman
concluded:
It does appear almost certain that the plaintiff would have
had possession of the fish but for the act of the defendant: but
it is quite certain that he had not possession. Whatever inter-
pretation may be put on such terms as "custody" and "posses-
sion," the question will be whether any custody or possession
has been obtained here. I think it is impossible to say that it
had, until the party had actual power over the fish.69
Lord Denman then noted, in a rarely discussed passage, that "[it
may be that the defendant acted unjustifiably in preventing the
plaintiff from obtaining such power: but that would only show a
wrongful act, for which he might be liable in a proper form of ac-
63 Id. at 176.
64 Id. at 178.
11 6 Q.B. 606, 115 Eng. Rep. 228 (1844).
Is Id. at 607-08, 115 Eng. Rep. at 228.
' Id. at 606-07, 115 Eng. Rep. at 228.
See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 217 (1881).
4, 6 Q.B. at 611, 115 Eng. Rep. at 230.
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tion. ' 70 Thus Lord Denman suggests that the plaintiff may have
failed to recover because he sued under the wrong writ, not be-
cause he was without a legally protected right.
The right in pursuit recognized in Lord Denman's dictum is
vindicated in Keeble v. Hickeringill.71 The plaintiff in Keeble sued
in an action on the case for the defendant's having "deprive[d] him
of the use and benefit of [a] decoy pond ' 72 used to attract ducks in
order to capture them. The defendant, standing on his own land
adjacent to plaintiff's, fired guns on two occasions to scare away
the ducks.7" The defendant moved that the declaration was not
good since the plaintiff did not own the ducks. Chief Judge Holt
rejected this defense, "for this action is not brought for his prop-
erty, but is brought for hindering him to take his profit. '74 "I]f
Mr. Hickeringill had set up another decoy on his own ground near
the plaintiff's, and that had spoiled the custom of the plaintiff, no
action would lie, because he had as much liberty to make and use a
decoy as the plaintiff. '75 In the case at bar, the defendant acted
not in the exercise of his own liberty to make a decoy; his acts were
"malicious. '76 Since the action was brought for harm not to the
plaintiff's property in the ducks, but for hinderance of his profit, it
was enough that the ducks were "in the plaintiff's decoy pond, and
so in his possession, which is sufficient without showing that he
had any property in them. ' 77 To restate Chief Judge Holt's conclu-
sion, the plaintiff in Keeble had a right in the profit from the duck
pond good against the world, subject to a privilege in anyone exer-
cising the same right to pursue ducks;78 that is, the plaintiff may
prevail against any interferor with his decoy pond except one pur-
suing the same ducks by means not otherwise tortious. 79 Among
7o Id. The right form of action would probably have been an action in trespass on the
case or trover. Broadly speaking, trespass on the case was the immediate common-law ante-
cedent for the modern negligence action, and trover was the most common action for trying
title to moveable goods. See F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF AcTION AT COMMON LAW 71 (1948).
71 3 Salk. 9, 91 Eng. Rep. 659 (K.B. 1707). See supra note 58.
72 Id. at 9, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659 (emphasis omitted).
73 Id.
"I Cas. t. Holt at 19, 90 Eng. Rep. at 909.
75 11 East at 576, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128.
70 3 Salk. at 9, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659.
77 3 Salk. at 10, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659 (emphasis in original).
78 See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (particularly the discussion of privilege at 34-35).
79 This pattern of rights in property with reciprocal privileges in other users is not
unique to wild animal or interference law. It occurs again in the pattern of rights to a
stream vested in an owner of riparian land. Under the so-called American rule, a riparian
owner, by virtue of his owning land bordering a stream, has a right to use as much water as
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themselves, no pursuer acquires rights superior to those of any
other pursuer. The defendant in Keeble was not a pursuer and
hence not within the scope of this privilege.
Both Pierson and Young recognize that although a pursuer
may not have sufficient control over an animal to create rights in
the animal itself, he may still have rights in the free pursuit of that
animal. Keeble adds that the right of a pursuer to free pursuit,
before he obtains any control over the animal, is good against all
but other pursuers.80
Two cases from the whaling industry illustrate the next stage
in the process from pursuit to capture. In this stage, the initial
pursuer has gained some degree of physical control over the animal
pursued, though not enough to satisfy the complete control re-
quirement of the first possession rule. Because the pursuer has
gained some control, he stands on superior footing to pursuers who
have not, as well as to nonpursuers. The pursuer in this stage has
gained control by "first possession" of the right to pursue.8 '
he can put to beneficial use, 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.56, at 163-64 (A. Casner
ed. 1954), subject to the absolute privilege of a prior (i.e., upstream) user to appropriate
water for natural use or use directly related to his ownership of riparian land. Id. at 165. A
similar pattern occurs in rights to a common pasture.
so It is possible that Pierson also recognizes that rights in pursuit may vest prior to
capture. The court took great pains to distinguish Pierson from Keeble. The court's discus-
sion of Keeble is contained in one paragraph:
The case cited from 11 Mod. 74-130, I think clearly distinguishable from the present;
inasmuch as there the action was for maliciously hindering and disturbing the plaintiff
in the exercise and enjoyment of a private franchise; and in the report of the same case,
(3 Salk. 9,) Holt, Ch. J., states, that the ducks were in the plaintiff's decoy pond, and so
in his possession, from which it is obvious the court laid much stress in their opinion
upon the plaintiff's possession of the ducks, ratione soli.
3 Cai. R. at 178-79. Lest the word "possession" be misunderstood, Holt states that the
plaintiff had a cause of action by showing merely that the ducks were "in the plaintiff's
decoy pond, and so in his possession, which is sufficient without shewing that he had any
property in them." 3 Salk. at 10, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659 (emphasis in original). Thus the court
in Pierson could not have been distinguishing Keeble on the grounds that the plaintiff in
Keeble already owned the ducks. It is reasonable to infer, therefore, that Pierson's reference
to plaintiff's "private franchise" was in recognition of a right to use a decoy to attract ducks,
which suggests a right not to be interfered with maliciously in the pursuit of ducks on one's
own land.
1 An analogy may be found in the common-law mining doctrine of pedis possssio. A
prospector on public lands does not acquire title to minerals until he has actually discovered
them and filed a patent. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 23, 29, 37 (1976). Prior to discovery, however, if a
miner maintains continuous actual occupancy of a claim, works his claim diligently, and
denies entry to rivals, he is protected against competing claims made by others after forci-
ble, fraudulent, clandestine, or surreptitious entry. See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S.
337, 346-48 (1919). See generally Comment, The General Mining Law and the Doctrine of
Pedis Possessio: The Case for Congressional Action, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026 (1982).
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In Littledale v. Scaith,s2 the. plaintiff owned a whaling ship
whose harpooner struck a whale; the harpoon remained in the
whale, and the harpooner retained control of the line. The defen-
dant then harpooned the whale and killed it. The plaintiff sued in
trover8 for the whale. The facts in Hogarth v. Jackson 4 are iden-
tical save in two respects: the harpoon had not remained in the
body of the whale, although the whale apparently remained entan-
gled in the plaintiff's line, and the plaintiff sued both in trover and
for "having interrupted the plaintiffs in killing a whale." 5 Both
cases were adjudged for the plaintiffs. In the words of the latter
court:
"[I]f the harpoon or line breaks, or the line attached to the
harpoon is not in the power of the striker, the fish is a loose
fish, and will become the property of any other person who
strikes and obtains it."
[I]f the fish is attached by means, such as the entan-
glement of the line, or other cause, to the boat of the party
first striking it, so that such party may be said to have the
power over it, it is considered as a fast fish, and cannot be
taken by any other vessel.
8 6
As the complaint in Hogarth suggests, the right interfered
with is not the right of ownership in the whale, but the right to
exclusive pursuit without interference.8 ' One line in a whale could
not by itself guarantee the certain control required by Pierson v.
Post for the vesting of title in the first harpooner.8 8 The line fast in
the whale and firm in the hand of the harpooner represents the
directness of connection that ensures the right to free pursuit. 9
82 1 Taunt. 243a, 127 Eng. Rep. 826 (York Assizes 1788).
83 Regarding trover, see supra note 70.
8 2 Car. & P. 595, 172 Eng. Rep. 271 (C.P. 1827).
88 Id. at 595, 172 Eng. Rep. at 271.
86 Id. at 596, 172 Eng. Rep. at 271 (quoting Fennings v. Lord Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241,
127 Eng. Rep. 825 (C.P. 1808)).
87 An action in trover was generally brought for the value of goods wrongfully con-
verted. F. MAITLAND, supra note 70, at 71. Since it was an offshoot of trespass, damages
were commonly limited to money. The essence of the action is the plaintiff's immediate
right to possession; unlike the writ of trespass proper, the plaintiff need not prove that he
had actual possession. 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 421 (1926).
88 See generally H. MELVILLE, THE WHALE; or MOBY DICK (London 1851).
88 But cf. Fennings. v. Lord Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241, 127 Eng. Rep. 825 (C.P. 1808), a
whaling case somewhat contrary in spirit to the two principal cases. While noting that the
rule in Littledale was accepted as the custom of the Greenland whale fishery, the court
found that the custom of the "Gallipagos [sic] Islands fishery" was to allow the party who
first struck a whale to share it equally with the eventual killer. Id. at 242-43, 127 Eng. Rep.
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Lacking that connection, a pursuer, such as the plaintiff in Pier-
son, cannot complain of interference by another pursuer.
B. Mental States
In many of the cases concerning rights in the pursuit of wild
animals, an analysis of the mental states of both the interferor and
the pursuer plays a prominent role. Holt, for example, grounds the
defendant's liability in Keeble on his malice in scaring the plain-
tiff's ducks.90 The court in Pierson, on the other hand, finds that
the pursuer of a wild animal may not maintain an action against
an interloper for taking the animal unless he has at least mortally
wounded the animal, for it is only then that the pursuer "manifests
an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his indi-
vidual use.""'-
The importance of mental state in the prima facie case of in-
terference liability has troubled many observers 9 2 for "[ilt is cer-
tainly a general rule of our law that an act prima facie lawful is not
unlawful and actionable on account of the motive which dictated
it." 3 The first of the supposed mental elements figuring in the
wild animal cases, the motive of the interferor, is not part of the
prima facie case, nor is it in fact a mental state at all. It is instead
an affirmative defense of privilege. Pursuers of a wild animal, at
least until one of them wounds or confines the animal, have recip-
rocal privileges of pursuit by virtue of their status as pursuers,
which is the same status that is the source of their right to nonin-
terference by nonpursuers.
The presence or absence of the privilege of pursuit in the in-
terferor does not alone determine liability, however. Pursuers who
at 826. The case reports, however, that the rule was not universally followed. Id. at 242, 127
Eng. Rep. at 826. In any event, the holding in Fennings does not bear directly on the result
in the two principal cases where the plaintiffs held fast lines. Cf. Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas.
558, 560 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696) (noting that the American custom of awarding a whale
to the first striker, provided he lays claim to the whale before a second boat kills and cuts
into it, overcomes the general rule of first possession).
so 3 Salk. at 9, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659. See also Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East 571, 572-73,
103 Eng. Rep. 1126, 1127, 2 Camp. 258, 170 Eng. Rep. 1148 (K.B. 1809) (the court predi-
cates liability for interference with the plaintiff's duck decoy on the defendant's "wilful
disturbance").
9 3 Cai. R. at 178.
" See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 129, at 927 (noting that "a wrongful motive in
itself may turn the scale in favor of liability," but questioning rationale); Intentional
Harms, supra note 18, at 394 ("the defendant's intention to harm . . . [is] insufficient to
state a prima facie case").
"Allen v. Flood, 1898 A.C. 1, 123-24 (H.L. 1897) (Lord Herschell).
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have acquired a certain degree of physical control over the animal
pursued, such as the plaintiff in Hogarth, may maintain an action
for interference against other pursuers, regardless of privilege. A
second true mental element forms part of the prima facie case of
all pursuit cases; the interferor is not liable unless he had notice of
the pursuit by the first pursuer.
This requirement of notice finds its source in the traditional
analysis of possession as comprising an element of power and an
element of intent.9 4 A typical statement of that analysis may be
found in Pierson: a pursuer of a wild animal "obtains possession,"
and hence owns it, when he "manifests an unequivocal intention of
appropriating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of
his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control."",
For the understanding of interference torts, the essential word in
that statement is "manifests," for it is only by making his inten-
tion to pursue known to others that the pursuer gains any right to
free pursuit.
The intent required to vest a property right is an objective
one. Oliver Wendell Holmes's discussion of possession in The Com-
mon Law reflects the objective quality of the intent required for
perfection of property rights. Holmes analyzed the requisite intent
in terms of the duties the law imposes on nonowners in dealing
with owners and their possessions. Duties are antecedent to rights.
The direct action of the law is a limitation on the freedom of ac-
tion of certain individuals, and rights are the vesting in other indi-
viduals of the capacity to enforce that limitation." The duty the
law imposes is the obligation not to interfere with another's prop-
erty, and the right vested by ownership is essentially the right not
to be interfered with or the right to exclude others from the use
and enjoyment of one's property. 7 The intent the law requires as a
predicate to the right of ownership, then, is not the intent to "ap-
propriate" a thing for one's own use, as Judge Tompkins deems it
in Pierson,9" but rather the "intent to exclude others."' ' 9 In order
to create a duty in another not to interfere with the owner's use or
enjoyment of his property, the owner must intend to exclude that
" It is almost a tautology that the existence of property rights in things physical or
incorporeal requires proprietary intent; if A does not intend to claim ownership of a thing,
even if it is within his power, then B may simply appropriate it for his own use.
91 3 Cai. R. at 178.
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 68, at 219-20.
9 Id. at 220.
98 3 Cai. R. at 178.
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 68, at 220.
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individual from his property.
Property rights do not rest upon purely subjective intent; pro-
prietary intent cannot remain locked in the owner's breast.100 Even
where physical control has been exercised over a thing, the mere
desire to exclude others will not suffice to maintain a right against
the world unless that desire has been made known to the person
excluded. 1'0 For example, a bona fide purchaser from a person with
apparent power to convey will prevail in cases where the original
owner is a bailor, 0 2 and he may prevail if he records his deed
before a prior purchaser.' The law creates no duty in the subse-
quent taker until he has notice of the prior owner's title; as against
the subsequent taker the owner has no rights until he has given
him notice, actual or constructive.
One area in particular in which the law protects a taker of
property without notice is intellectual property. At least two com-
mentators have analogized the law of intellectual property to inter-
ference law,1' principally because the objects of interference torts,
contract and expectancies, like patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets, are incorporeal. Although physical objects give notice in
most cases of the existence of some owner, ideas and contractual
relations do not. Actual or constructive notice must be given before
rights in ideas and contracts can be perfected. 0 5
Professor Epstein's remarks on intellectual property are
revealing:
Patents and copyrights, for example, create property rights in
their owners that cannot be reduced to physical possession.
100 This is also true elsewhere in the law. For example, the law of inchoate crimes re-
quires some overt act or substantial step as evidence of fixity of intent before it will impose
liability for conspiracy or attempt. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
§ 59, at 431-32, § 62, at 476 (1972).
101 The requirement of manifest notice of the intent to exclude explains the exceptional
treatment the law accords lost wild animals. Normally, a lost chattel remains the property
of its owner until he abandons it. Clark v. Maloney, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 68 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1840).
Possession of a wild animal, however, is lost as soon as an animal escapes, Reese v. Hughes,
144 Miss. 304, 305, 109 So. 731, 732 (1926); Mullet v. Bradley, 24 Misc. 695, 696, 53 N.Y.S.
781, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898), unless the animal is identified by earmarking, see, e.g., E.A.
Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15 (1927), or has become so domesticated as
to have an animus revertendi, W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *392. Whereas an inanimate
object may be presumed to be owned by someone who, without further evidence, has proba-
bly not abandoned it, a wild animal, absent the circumstances noted above, does not give
similar notice of its possession.
102 See, e.g., Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953).
103 See, e.g., Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939).
104 See Dobbs, supra note 29, at 352-53; Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 425.
100 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Yet once their subject matter is identified, they share the es-
sential features of tangible property in that they too create
rights of exclusive use and control good against the entire
world. These interests, moreover, are protected by actions
against infringement that are strict in form, as the defen-
dant's intention to appropriate plaintiff's copyright or patent
for his own use forms no part of the prima facie case.108
While stressing that actions for patent or copyright infringement,
like those protecting other species of property, are strict in form,
Epstein's account glosses over the statutory requirement of regis-
tration and appropriate labeling, without which an action for in-
fringement cannot be maintained. 10 7 The function of such require-
ments is to provide the world with constructive notice of the
owner's intent to exclude others from the unlicensed use of his
idea.108 The one common-law intellectual property right, protection
of trade secrets, has much the same contours as the law of bail-
ments: anyone who learns of a trade secret, and has reason to know
that it is a trade secret and that the person from whom he learned
it breached a duty to its owner by disclosing it, is liable to its own-
er for use or disclosure;'0 9 one who acquires a trade secret without
notice, however, may disclose it without liability and, in so doing,
destroys the original owner's rights in it as against subsequent
users.
110
108 Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 425 (footnote omitted).
10 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 411, 412 (1976) (copyrights); 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 287 (1976)
(patents).
108 Because of the lack of opportunity for recording the pursuit of wild animals, most
actions for interference with that pursuit rest on actual knowledge. Notice of pursuit, how-
ever, like notice of other species of incorporeal property, may be actual or constructive,
hence a plaintiff need not show that the defendant knowingly interfered with his pursuit,
merely that he should have known. Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East 571, 103 Eng. Rep. 1126, 2
Camp. 258, 170 Eng. Rep. 1148 (K.B. 1809), illustrates the distinction. The plaintiff owned
an "ancient decoy" of "long uninterrupted enjoyment" in which he was accustomed to cap-
turing wildfowl. 2 Camp. at 258, 260, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1148, 1149. The defendant in turn
was licensed to shoot wildfowl on the river where the decoy was situated. 11 East at 572, 103
Eng. Rep. at 1126. The plaintiff brought an action for the disturbance caused to his decoy
by the defendant's firing his gun. There was no evidence that the defendant knew of the
decoy, since he did not approach nearer to it than two or three hundred yards, nor did the
defendant fire at the ducks in the decoy, 2 Camp. at 258, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1148; indeed, the
defendant argued that, since the interference was "innocent, the foundation of the action
failed." Id. at 259, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1148. The court upheld the action, finding the defen-
dant's interference malicious as a matter of law where the decoy is ancient. Id. at 259-60,
170 Eng. Rep. at 1148-49.
109 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). See, e.g., Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.W. Dar-
ling Co., 238 Md. 93, 113-15, 208 A.2d 74, 84-85 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
11 Underwriter Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954-55 (D.C.
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Liability for interference with the pursuit of wild animals, sug-
gests Holt,"' is predicated on malice. If malice is taken to mean
intent to inflict harm, it is difficult to see how malice can be an
element of the prima facie case of either a strict liability or a negli-
gence tort. Broken down into notice and lack of privilege, however,
malice's role in interference torts emerges. Without notice of the
pursuit, an interferor has no duty not to interfere, and hence the
pursuer has no right in the pursuit enforceable against him; Keeble
would not have had an action against Hickeringill if Hickeringill
had only discharged his guns while hunting on his own land or in
self-defense, oblivious to Keeble's decoy. Privilege negates malice
and serves as an affirmative defense, protecting fellow pursuers of
the same animal where no pursuer has yet exerted a significant de-
gree of control over the object of pursuit.1 2
In the first stage of pursuit, before any such control is
achieved, liability attaches only where the interferor has notice of
the pursuit and is not himself pursuing the same object. Notice
plus lack of interest in the pursuit imply malice in the traditional
sense. The law of interference torts presumes the intent to bring
about the natural and probable results of interference from the in-
terferor's knowledge of competing pursuers, and his lack of interest
in the pursuit suggests an intent solely to harm the pursuer. In the
second stage of pursuit, the interferor's liability is predicated on
notice alone, without regard to whether he is pursuing the animal.
The plaintiffs in Littledale and Hogarth did not need to plead or
prove malice to recover for interference once their whales were
fast.
C. Interference Liability and Stages of Acquisition of Property
Rights in Pursuit
From the preceding examination of the acquisition of rights in
wild animals four stages may be discerned. This four-stage struc-
ture of liability is comparable to the structure of interference lia-
bility. First, of course, is the stage before pursuit commences. In
this stage, no cause of action exists even for the most direct and
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1967).
" Keeble, 3 Salk. at 10, 91 Eng. Rep. at 659 ("an action will lie. . . for a malicious act
done by one to another").
"' See Keeble, 11 East at 576, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128 ("[I]f Mr. Hickeringill had set up
another decoy on his own ground near the plaintiff's, and that had spoiled the custom of the
plaintiff, no action would lie, because he had as much liberty to make and use a decoy as the
plaintiff.").
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malign interference; Post could not have complained if, while he
sat sunning himself on the beach, Pierson slew the fox out of
spite."" The last stage equally clearly is that of ownership by vir-
tue of first possession. The rights of ownership correspond to those
that attach to an executed contract for purposes of interference
law. Pierson seems to stand for the proposition that no intermedi-
ate stages exist. 114
The foregoing analysis, however, suggests the existence of two
intermediate stages. The first, demonstrated in Keeble, is reached
when the pursuer begins the pursuit of a specific animal or group
of animals. Liability at this stage rests on notice of the pursuit plus
lack of the privilege conferred by the interloper's pursuit. As noted
above, in most circumstances these two elements imply malice, on
which liability for interference with expectancies is traditionally
said to rest,"' and they find their analogues in interference law in
notice of the expectancy on the part of the interferor and a lack of
genuine commercial interest in the object of the expectancy. No-
tice of the expectancy is required if the party interfered with is to
have a right good against the interferor, because notice is necessary
to evidence the intent to exclude that is a predicate of ownership.
The second element, lack of a genuine commercial intent, negates
the interferor's right to pursue which, at this stage, would other-
wise stand on equal footing with *the rights of the party interfered
with, giving him a privilege to interfere." 6
The second intermediate stage of the pursuit of a wild animal,
demonstrated in Hogarth, succeeds the first when the pursuer has
exerted a significant degree of control over the animal by wounding
it, putting a line in or around it (as in Hogarth), or surrounding it.
At this stage, the pursuer has obtained an exclusive right to pursue
that animal. The pursuer may maintain an action for interference
113 An example of such a case in the realm of economic harms is provided by Mayor of
Bradford v. Pickles, 1895 A.C. 587 (H.L.). The plaintiff represented the Borough of Brad-
ford, which lay below land owned by the defendant. The defendant dug a shaft into his
land, the effect of which was to diminish the flow from, and discolor two springs on, the
plaintiff's land fed by water percolating down from the defendant's land. The plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant maliciously interfered with the flow of water in order to force the
Borough to buy him out. Id. at 589. The court held that where the plaintiff has no property
rights whatever in the percolating water, the defendant's motives, however malicious, were
irrelevant. Id. at 594, 598-99, 601.
1'4 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
118 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 130, at 952.
"e See supra note 79, where it is observed that a riparian owner has a privilege to
appropriate for natural uses, where no such privilege exists for non-natural uses. A similar




against anyone with notice of the pursuit, regardless of the motive
of the interferor. By wounding or trapping the animal, the pursuer
obtains rights superior to those of any new pursuer in the pursuit.
This stage in the pursuit of animals corresponds to that of an exec-
utory contract in the area of economic torts; although the contract
does not convey a property right in the performance of the obligor,
it does confer on the obligee an exclusive right to pursue that per-
formance free from interference.
This analysis of economic torts as interferences with rights in
pursuit of performance solves the two problems of damages that
concerned Professor Perlman. Perlman noted that the damages re-
coverable for interference with contracts and expectancies exceed
either the amount recoverable from the obligor or prospective per-
former (in the latter case, zero) or the value of the performance.
He also noted that in the case of contracts, the obligee remains
entitled to contract damages against the obligor, which are in the-
ory equal to the value of performance, hence the obligee seems to
have suffered no harm.117 Under the present theory, the amount of
damages recoverable for interference torts represents the proxi-
mate consequences of interference with the right to pursue, only
one of which is the loss of the value of performance, and which
include emotional harm and loss of good will.118
For both stages of liability, the theory of this comment re-
quires that the two central notions of interference liability, notice
and privilege of pursuit (in the case of wild animals) or of commer-
cial interest (in the case of contracts and expectancies), be read
narrowly. When A engages in pursuit and gives B notice of the
pursuit, A's rights and privileges against B extend only to the ob-
ject of his pursuit. In the first stage of pursuit the source of A's
privilege to interfere with B's pursuit is the symmetry of their po-
sitions with respect to the animal or good pursued. When A and B
pursue different objects, each has a right to pursue that is good
against the other, but neither has a privilege to interfere. For ex-
ample, if the defendant in Oppen 19 had notice that the fishermen
117 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
118 Cf. the remarks of Judge Compton in Lumley:
Nor is it an answer, to say that there is a remedy against the contractor, and that the
party relies on the contract; for. . . the action on the contract and the action against
the malicious wrong-doer may be for a different matter; and the damages occasioned by
such malicious injury might be calculated on a very different principle from the
amount of the debt which might be the only sum recoverable on the contract.
2 El. & B1. at 229-30, 118 Eng. Rep at 754.
211 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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regularly fished the Santa Barbara Channel, the fact that oil spills
were a consequence of the defendant's search for oil would not
confer on it a privilege to harm the fishermen's expectancy in the
fish.
Temperton v. Russell" ° demonstrates the operation of notice
and the privilege of commercial interest. The plaintiff in
Temperton was a master mason who supplied materials to a build-
ing firm; he had refused to break contracts with those builders who
would not obey union rules. Defendants, members of a joint com-
mittee of three trade unions, persuaded suppliers of the plaintiff to
breach existing contracts and not to enter into further contracts
with him. Even though the defendants acted to advance their own
commercial interests, the court found they had no interest in the
subject matter of the plaintiff's contracts and expectancies, hence
under the theory of this comment, liability was rightly imposed.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a privilege that
is broader in two respects. First, it recognizes a privilege for a
knowing interference with a contract if the interference is suffi-
ciently remote and is done to further an independent, primary in-
terest of the interferor, such as his own commercial interests.' 2 '
Second, it protects an interferor with an expectancy who acts to
safeguard his preexisting financial interest in the goods or services
pursued by another.122 The basic privilege, however, extends only
to competition for the same goods or services. 23
The quality of notice implicit in the intent requirement varies
according to the type of property involved. Generally speaking, no-
tice is of three types: actual, constructive, and inquiry. Construc-
tive notice is notice imputed by law from certain facts, chiefly from
recording. Inquiry notice is provided by information which would
cause a reasonable person to engage in an inquiry that would dis-
close the facts in question. 21 It is generally impractical for a pur-
suer of wild animals to give other than actual notice, since he typi-
cally will be in hot pursuit. 2 5 Rights of ownership in trade secrets,
on the other hand, may be maintained against anyone who has rea-
son to suspect that he has learned of what might be a trade secret
120 [1893] 1 Q.B. 715.
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766 comment j, 767 comment d, 768(1)(d)
(1979).
122 Id. § 769.
123 Id. § 768 comment d.
12, See generally 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY
LAW 899-904 (3d ed. 1979).
125 But see the discussion of Carrington v. Taylor, supra note 108.
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through possibly improper means. 126 As to contracts and expectan-
cies, constructive notice, with the exception of contracts for the
sale of land in some jurisdictions, 27 is not available, and courts
seem unwilling to allow recovery based on inquiry notice unless
that notice is of facts relating to specific contracts or expectancies
and not to a general course of trade. Thus in Tarleton v.
M'Gawley,128 the court found the defendant liable for firing at, and
scaring away, natives who had gathered at the shore intending to
trade with the plaintiff's ship, which was laying off the coast; in
contrast, the court in Byrd v. English 29 declined to impose liabil-
ity on a defendant whose workmen negligently damaged electric
lines leading to the plaintiff's neighboring plant. This restriction of
inquiry notice to facts concerning a specific contract or expectancy
parallels the restriction of the privilege of pursuit to pursuit of the
same economic advantage discussed above. 30
III. INTERFERENCE TORTS
This comment has provided a theoretical basis for interference
torts. It has shown that, like other torts, interference torts protect
recognized property rights, in particular, a right in pursuit. The
mental element of malice traditionally associated with interference
liability is described in this theory as composed of the notice re-
quired to exclude others, which is an element of the prima facie
case, and the lack of an affirmative defense of privilege. This part
treats a number of well-known interference cases in light of the
property analysis derived from wild animal cases discussed above.
A. Expectancies
Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick"'3 provides a clear case of liabil-
ity for interference with an expectancy. Gregory had entered into
an at-will contract to perform Hamlet. On opening night, the two
defendants and a substantial portion of the audience hooted and
jeered the plaintiff off the stage because of their hostility to a
newspaper published by the plaintiff. The management rang down
the curtain. Plaintiff was discharged and sued the defendants for
the remaining value of the contractual series of performances as
I'l See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment 1, illustrations 3 & 4 (1939).
117 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5301.25 (Page 1981).
"' Peake 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
119 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903).
SO See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
... 6 Man. & G. 205, 953, 134 Eng. Rep. 866, 1178 (C.P. 1843).
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well as the harm occasioned by his subsequent inability to find em-
ployment as an actor. Although the jury later found that the plain-
tiff's harms could not be traced to the defendants' actions, and
hence awarded the plaintiff no damages, 13 2 the court found, in
overruling the defendant's demurrer, that a conspiracy to prevent
the plaintiff from performing so as to hinder him in advancing his
career stated a cause of action. 133 Given the foregoing analysis, lia-
bility properly followed from knowledge plus lack of commercial
interest in the expectancy, even though hissing in a theater is per-
fectly legal."3
Where either notice of the expectancy is lacking or a commer-
cial interest in the expectancy exists, an interferor with an expec-
tancy will not incur liability. Tuttle v. Buck "35 and Allen v.
Flood 36 illustrate the consequences of a legitimate commercial in-
terest where the defendant has knowingly interfered with an ex-
pectancy. In the latter case, defendant Allen was a representative
of the boilermakers' union; the plaintiffs were rival shipwrights.
The boilermakers' union objected to the employment of ship-
wrights on iron work. Accordingly, when the shipwrights were em-
ployed by the Glengall Iron Co., the boilermakers told the com-
pany that unless it terminated its at-will contract with the
shipwrights, the boilermakers would walk off the job. Glengall
complied with the defendants' demands. In a suit for interference
with the shipwrights' prospective earnings from Glengall, the
House of Lords held for the defendants. The court did not distin-
guish between interference with contracts terminable at will and
"32 Id. at 956, 134 Eng. Rep. at 1179-80.
133 Id. at 959, 134 Eng. Rep. at 1180. The court regarded the element of conspiracy as
essential, as did the court in Temperton v. Russell. Judge Coltman stated that although the
malicious act of one might be actionable, "it would be very difficult to infer such a motive
from the insulated acts of one person unconnected with others." Id. at 959, 134 Eng. Rep. at
1180. The court in Temperton finessed the point; where a malicious conspiracy to deprive
the beneficiary of an expectancy exists, the question of the liability of an individual actor
need not be decided. 1 Q.B.D. at 729 (opinion of Lord Esher, M.R.). As the remarks of
Judge Coltman suggest, the present importance of conspiracy is evidentiary only.
"', Under Epstein's account, no liability could be found, since the means of interference
was not force or fraud. Epstein, supra note 40, at 49.
135 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
136 1898 A.C. 1 (H.L. 1897). Another case in this category is Mogul v. McGregor, 1892
A.C. 25 (H.L. 1891). It is revealing that both Bowen, L.J. in the Queen's Bench, and the
House of Lords treated a plaintiff who complained that the defendants had driven him out
of the tea trade with artificially low prices as having stated a prima facie case; the House of
Lords's unanimous ecision for the defendants turns on the question of privilege. See 23
Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), 1892 A.C. at 57 (opinion of Lord Field) (all the judges' opinions
concern principally whether the defendants' means of interference were within the bounds
of fair competition).
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with expectancies, into which category it impliedly put the plain-
tiffs' interest."' 7 The court found that the defendants' conduct was
protected by the right of free competition in labor.38 Where an
interferor knowingly interferes with an expectancy in the exercise
of his own right to offer his services, no liability attaches.13 9
In Tuttle, the plaintiff was a barber in a small village. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a wealthy banker in the vil-
lage, set out to ruin the plaintiff's business by hiring barbers to set
up a rival shop and by furnishing them with a shop rent-free in
order to undercut the plaintiff's prices. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirmed without opinion the lower court's denial of the
defendant's demurrer."1 0 Judge Elliott, reporting the decision of
the majority, voted to reverse on the ground that the complaint
failed to allege that the defendant was intentionally running his
business at a loss or that he intended to or did go out of business
after the plaintiff was ruined,1 41 either of which would have proved
that the defendant had no real commercial interest in the barber's
trade. Elliott had no doubt, however, that an action would lie if the
defendant were not acting in the exercise of his legal right to profit
from the barbering business.142 Tuttle illustrates the proper mean-
ing to be attached to malice in interference cases: malice is not the
"1 1898 A.C. at 21 (opinion of Hawkins, J.) ("[i]n the present case no contract was
broken").
133 The court analogized Allen to Mogul, where the defendants were protected by the
right of free competition in trade. See, e.g., id. at 164 (opinion of Lord Shand). Regrettably,
Allen uses the term "malice," whose definition as used there is unworkably vague. Since
malice in the view of this comment is an amalgam of knowledge, a part of the prima facie
case, and lack of commercial interest, it is difficult to interpret remarks such as, "'No use of
property which would be legal, if due to a proper motive, can become illegal because it is
prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious."' Id. at 168 (quoting Bradford
Corp. v. Pickles, 1895 A.C. 587 (H.L.)). If malice means evil intent, then this pronouncement
contradicts the Gregory dictum. Since knowledge is regarded as implying intent (a person
intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts at common law), and lack of
commercial interest leads one to suspect an intent to injure, it is easy to see how knowledge
plus lack of commercial interest is phrased as evil intent.
139 In Temperton, in contrast, the defendant had no interest in the expectancy inter-
fered with and was held liable. See supra text following note 120.
107 Minn. at 145, 119 N.W. at 946.
1 Id. at 151, 119 N.W. at 948 (Elliott, J., dissenting).
42 [W]hen a man starts an opposition place of business, not for the sake of profit to
himself, but regardless of loss to himself, and for the sole purpose of driving his com-
petitor out of business, and with the intention of himself retiring upon the accomplish-
ment of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort.
In such a case he would not be exercising his legal rights. . ..
Id. Concededly, under the analysis proposed here the question of the defendant's commer-
cial interest would properly belong in the answer, not in the complaint, and hence should
not figure in the court's review of the denial of the defendant's demurrer.
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presence of malign intent, of which there was no lack in Tuttle,
but the absence of a genuine commercial interest.
Where the interferor is unaware of the expectancy, courts con-
sistently decline to impose liabilty. 43 One such case is Rickards v.
Sun Oil Co.""' The plaintiffs in Rickards owned businesses on an
island off New Jersey. The defendant, for the purposes of his de-
murrer, admitted to having negligently crashed into the bridge
that formed the only link between the island and the mainland,
causing the plaintiffs to lose business. The court held for the de-
fendant; the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, since
the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen injury to the
plaintiffs, thus negating proximate cause. 145 Under Epstein's cor-
rective justice account of tort law, such a limitation on liability for
unforeseeable harms is merely ad hoc.146 Absent other considera-
tions, if the defendant caused the harm, he should be liable if he
has interfered with a protected right of the plaintiff; if no right has
been infringed, no inquiry into the foreseeability of the harm is
necessary. Following the analysis advanced in this comment, how-
ever, the court's reasoning makes more sense. The defendant had a
duty to avoid harming the plaintiff's expectancy if and only if the
plaintiff had a right in it, 147 which depends in turn on whether the
defendant had notice of the plaintiff's expectancy. If one substi-
tutes "foreseen" for "foreseeable" in the definition of proximate
cause, the result and analysis of Rickards are entirely consistent
with the analysis set forth above.
B. Contracts
When an obligee enters into a contract with an obligor, he ob-
tains an exclusive right to the obligor's performance. Like the pur-
suer of a wild animal who has significantly advanced towards cap-
ture, the obligee has materially advanced toward obtaining the
obligor's performance and thereby has a right to acquire that per-
formance, a right that is superior to a third party's right to ad-
vance his own commercial interest. Thus the second component of
malice, lack of commercial interest of the interferor in the per-
143 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 130, at 952 (intent to interfere ordinarily required,
which would imply knowledge of the expectancy).
"1" 23 N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945).
Id. at 94, 41 A.2d at 269.
148 See Intentional Harms, supra note 18, at 429-30 (in an analysis of a similar case,
Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903), Epstein suggests that failure to find liabil-
ity is grounded in a desire by the court to avoid crushing burdens for negligent conduct).
147 See generally Hohfeld, supra note 78, at 30-32.
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formance of the obligee, drops out, and the mental element re-
quired to establish interference with contract is mere notice of the
contract.
Unlike the case of an expectancy, where notice of the contract
has been given, a genuine commercial interest no longer confers a
privilege.148 The famous case of Lumley v. Gye1 49 illustrates this
proposition. The plaintiff had a contract obligating Johanna Wag-
ner to sing exclusively at the Queen's Theatre during the spring
season of 1852. The defendant, knowing of the plaintiff's contract,
offered Miss Wagner a larger sum to abandon her first contract
and sing at Covent Garden.1 50 The court found for the plaintiff
without inquiring into the defendant's motives or interest in pro-
curing the breach of the first contract. Liability was predicated on
knowledge; "it must now be considered clear law that a person who
wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with no-
tice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant
• . . commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible at law."151
Where, on the other hand, the interferor has no knowledge of
the contract, not even a negligent or criminal act that deprives the
obligee of the benefit of his bargain will be actionable.1 52 Thus,
where the defendant kills a policy holder of the plaintiff insurance
company, no liability for the value of the policy exists. 15 3 In the
well-known case of Byrd v. English,15 the defendant's workmen
negligently damaged the plaintiff's electric lines, causing an inter-
ruption in the operations of plaintiff's plant. The court found for
'4s The presence of ill will on the part of the interferor towards the obligee to a contract
is irrelevant. For example, in South Wales Miners' Fed'n v. Glamorgan Coal Co., 1905 A.C.
239 (H.L.), the defendant, a coal miners' union, induced its miners to abstain from working
on certain days. The miners' wages were tied to the price of coal, which the defendant
sought to elevate by reducing the amount of coal mined. The trial judge found that the
defendant was motivated solely by an honest desire to help its workers, and not by any ill
will towards the plaintiffs. Id. at 240. In finding for the plaintiffs, Lord James held the
absence of ill will and the presence of an interest in the subject matter of the contract to be
irrelevant. "The fact that [the defendant's] motives were good in the interests of those they
moved to action does not form any answer to those who have suffered from the unlawful
act." Id. at 252.
149 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
'50 The full facts were set out in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep.
687 (Ch. 1852) (suit in equity to enjoin Wagner from singing at the defendant's theater).
151 2 El. & Bl. at 224, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53 (emphasis added). The court's use of the
term "relation" reflects the roots of the cause of action in the Statute of Labourers. See
generally supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
1M2 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 129, at 941.
1'3 Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877).
1" 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903).
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the defendant on the grounds of remoteness of damages,'55 as did
the court in Rickards."'56 Under the present analysis, lack of liabil-
ity follows directly from the fact that the defendant had no notice
of the plaintiff's contract. 57
CONCLUSION
The law recognizes two intermediate stages of property rights
in both the pursuit of wild animals and the acquisition of perform-
ance. The first is marked when a party begins pursuit or com-
mences trade. The law grants a right good against the world to free
pursuit, subject to a privilege in others similarly interested to pur-
sue the animal or the performance. The acquisition of such a right,
as with the perfection of rights in other species of incorporeal
property, depends on notice being given to third parties of the pur-
suer's intent to exclude. The second stage is marked by the pur-
suer's having 'obtained some definite degree of physical control
over an animal or having entered into a contract. At this stage,
although the pursuer or obligee has acquired no property right in
the thing itself, he has acquired an exclusive right to pursue, de-
priving other pursuers of the privilege of pursuit or commercial
interest.
This analysis accounts for several inadequacies in prior discus-
sions of interference torts. s First, malice, divided into its constit-
uent elements of notice or knowledge and lack of commercial inter-
est, remains the center of the prima facie case, consistent with a
corrective justice explanation. Second, the unified treatment of the
law of interference with contracts, in which the obligee has and
retains rights against the obligor, and of interference with expec-
tancies, in which he has none, is the consequence of looking not at
the prospective rights of the pursuer in the object of pursuit but at
his current rights against other pursuers to free pursuit of perform-
ance, which in both cases is not yet obtained. Finally, this analysis
accounts for the fact that the damages in tort for interference ex-
ceed those recoverable against either the obligor in contract or the
prospective performer; although the proximate consequence of the
interference is a loss of the performance sought, for the value of
which the pursuer may recover, the right interfered with is the
"' Id. at 194-95, 43 S.E. at 421.
1" See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing proximate cause).
158 See supra notes 18-54 and accompanying text.
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right to pursue, which is wholly distinct from the rights afforded
by contract law to the obligor against the obligee.
Benjamin L. Fine
